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about the People's War against nazism. 
 
  
 4 
 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
With the fall of France in the summer of 
1940, Britain was faced with the prospect of 
invasion and occupation. Britain’s 
comparatively small army was overstretched, 
and in dire need of expansion and re-
equipment, having abandoned most of its 
modern equipment at Dunkirk. In these 
circumstances, the creation of the Local 
Defence Volunteers, later called the Home 
Guard, was a symbol of the country’s will to 
resist Nazi Germany. But the Home Guard 
lacked equipment, weapons, and training. To 
a large degree, it was up to these civilian 
volunteers to organise matters for 
themselves. It was in this context that a 
group of veterans of the recently ended 
Spanish Civil War stepped forward to make 
a significant contribution to the training of the 
Home Guard. These men, who had fought 
with the International Brigades and the 
revolutionary militias, saw in the Home 
Guard the beginnings of a ‘People’s Army’. 
This little booklet attempts to outline the 
Home Guard socialists’ vision, and looks, in 
detail, at their writing and their concept of the 
Home Guard as Britain’s People’s Army. 
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2. International Volunteers and the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-9. 
 
 
Volunteers for Spain 
 
Seventy years after the failed military coup of 
July 1936 which began the Spanish Civil War, 
the conflict still arouses fierce passions. On the 
left, Trotskyists, anarchists, and communists  
argue about events and interpretations1,  while 
the books of mainstream historians, most notably 
Paul Preston and Anthony Beevor2 , are popular 
with the reading public. The continued interest in 
the Spanish Civil War is, nonetheless, a faint 
echo of the contemporary passions aroused 
around the world in 1936-39. 
 
Although the causes of the Spanish conflict lay 
deep within Spanish history and society, the 
wider context of the 1930s meant that many non-
Spaniards saw in the war issues of international 
importance. For many democrats, and for those 
on the left, the military rebellion, soon to be led 
by General Franco, seemed to be yet another 
example of the advance of the authoritarian right 
in Europe. The rebels were supported by 
conservative political parties, most of the 
Catholic Church (with the notable exception of 
the church in the nationalist Basque Country), 
key elements of the army (especially that based 
in Spanish Morocco), monarchists, traditionalist 
Spaniards, and the small Spanish fascist 
movement, the Falange.  For those on the right, 
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however, the legally elected government of 
Spain seemed to represent another assault on 
the principles of private property, patriotism, and 
religion. Anarchists, various varieties of Stalinist 
and anti-Stalinist Marxists, atheists and 
socialists, as well as middle of the road 
democrats, all opposed the military rebellion. 
And, to add even greater confusion to the 
picture, the great powers of Europe - democratic 
France and Britain, nazi Germany, fascist Italy, 
and Stalin's USSR - all saw the Spanish conflict 
through the lens of great power politics. 
 
All these factors meant that there was little 
chance that the war would remain a purely 
Spanish affair. From the outset, foreign 
intervention in Spain was notable. Franco himself 
was flown from a remote army outpost in the 
Canary Islands to the seat of the rebellion in 
Spanish Morocco by an English pilot, Captain 
Bebb, hired, with his Dragon Rapide aircraft, 
from Croydon airport. The military rebellion was 
greatly aided in its opening days, by Italian and 
German transport aircraft, and both Mussolini 
and Hitler quickly promised and delivered more 
military aid to the rebels. Aid to the government 
came at first from France, Mexico, then, more 
importantly, from the Soviet Union. But, 
thousands of individuals were soon to make their 
way to Spain to fight on behalf of the nationalists 
or the Republic.  
 
On the left, the communist parties affiliated to the 
Soviet revolution, organised and controlled by 
the Comintern, created the International 
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Brigades (IB). These were not the first 
international volunteers to fight the rebels, or the 
'fascists', as at the time of the rebellion, anti-
fascist athletes had been in Barcelona for the 
Workers' Olympiad (to have been held in 
opposition to the official Berlin Olympics of 
1936). Many of these athletes, and other 
international volunteers, had already seen action 
defending the Republic by the time the first 
International Brigade, the 11th, was formed. 
Eventually, some 30-40,000 people joined the IB, 
including exiles from nazi Germany and fascist 
Italy. The British contribution to the IB came in 
the shape of 2,300 men, of whom 526 were 
killed, and around 1,200 wounded; casualty rates 
which graphically represented the ferocity of the 
fighting they were involved in. Most, but not all, 
of these fighters were communists, while many 
others were from different left-wing backgrounds, 
and some were simply anti-fascist3.  Similarly, 
thousands went to Spain to fight against the 
Republic, with volunteers, of one sort and 
another, from Ireland, France, Portugal, Italy, 
and Germany being the most notable4.  
 
The Italian, German and Soviet militaries all 
tested new equipment and methods in Spain, 
and learnt, or so they thought, new lessons for  a 
wider, world war they believed was coming. 
Tanks, area bombing (most infamously by the 
Condor Legion in the Basque Country), and the 
political mobilisation of the people all figured in 
Spain. In addition, people became accustomed 
to the idea of irregular warfare. The nationalist 
rebels boasted of their 'Fifth Column' inside 
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Madrid - urban fighters conducting 
assassinations, spying and sabotage to aid 
besieging conventional forces. On the 
Republican side, irregular, militia forces 
belonging to various anarchist, trade unionist, 
socialist and Marxist groups, played a decisive 
part in defeating the rebels in the early days of 
the war, from 1936 to the spring of 19375. These 
militias, the non-military background of most of 
the international volunteers in the IB, and the 
widespread belief that saboteurs and spies were 
everywhere behind the lines on both sides, 
seemed to put a good deal of the Spanish Civil 
War in the tradition of modern irregular warfare. 
 
 
Unconventional warfare 1914-1939 
 
Unconventional warfare was not new in Europe, 
with, for example, Napoleon's occupation of the 
Spanish peninsular being fiercely resisted by 
guerrillas but, from the First World War on  
famous examples of unconventional forces 
fighting traditional armies seized the popular 
imagination. In the First World War, two 
practitioners of  unconventional warfare had 
become famous - the British T.E.Lawrence 
fighting with Arab irregulars against the Ottoman 
Empire, and the German Paul von Lettow-
Vorbeck fighting the Allies in German East 
Africa, holding the armies of the British Empire, 
South Africa, Belgium and Portugal at bay for 
four years6. The Russian Civil War also had its 
masters of unconventional fighting, most 
famously the army of the charismatic anarchist 
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leader, Nestor Makhno7; while, much closer at 
home for the British, the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), under the ill-fated Michael Collins, waged 
an eventually successful guerrilla war against the 
British Army, the Royal Irish Constabulary, and 
various British irregular forces8. The IRA then 
went on to split over the treaty they had signed 
with Britain, and a civil war ensued in which 
irregular tactics again played a large part. What 
was of interest in the Irish case was that an 
irregular force fought both urban and rural war 
against mobile, conventionally organised armies 
in a western European context. Irregular war also 
characterised the emergence of the successor 
states, for example, Poland, Finland and the 
Baltic states, in the post First World War 
struggles. In addition, political militias helped 
create the conditions for Mussolini's fascist take-
over of Italy9, and characterised the failed 
Bolshevik risings in Germany and Hungary. 
Further afield, in China, both nationalist and 
communist forces, not to mention a host of 
warlords, also resorted to unconventional 
warfare10. It seemed, therefore, even before the 
Spanish Civil War, that irregular, often politically 
motivated, troops had a key role to play in 
modern warfare. 
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3. The Second World War and Britain in 
1940. 
 
 
In April 1940 German forces invaded Norway, 
pre-empting an Allied occupation of that 
strategically important country. As a result, 
Neville Chamberlain's government was replaced  
by Winston Churchill's wartime coalition. 
Churchill primarily concerned himself with issues 
of strategy and foreign policy, while domestic 
British politics was largely in the hands of the 
Labour Party, which worked closely with the 
trades union movement. The war came to be 
known as 'The People's War'11. The Home Guard 
was a key part of the People's War, as were 
other paramilitary, volunteer organisations, like 
the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), and Air Raid 
Precautions (ARP). The ROC, for example, was 
an integral part of Britain's air defences, spotting 
attacking enemy aircraft, and reporting their 
movements to the Royal Air Force's fighter 
controllers. By 1941, there were over 30,000 
men and women in the ROC, largely part-time 
volunteers12. The ARP, the Red Cross, and other 
organisations, like the Auxiliary Fire Service and 
the Air Cadets, were all essential elements in the 
mass mobilisation of the British people.  
 
The Home Guard was created in May, 1940, 
following a radio appeal by Anthony Eden, 
Secretary of State for War, for male volunteers, 
aged between 15 and 55, to defend local areas 
in Britain against German paratroopers, potential 
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British Fifth Columnists, and saboteurs. The 
response was overwhelming, with 400,000 men 
volunteering within two weeks for the new force - 
called, at first, the Local Defence Volunteers 
(LDV). Among these men were active left-
wingers, who saw in this mass organisation the 
beginnings of a People’s Army, something akin 
to the Republican and anarchist militias which 
had fought the nationalist rebels in Spain in the 
early part of the Spanish Civil War. These men, 
often veterans of the Spanish war themselves, or 
influenced by it and other irregular campaigns in 
the inter-war years, felt that they could create a 
new type of military force in Britain. Such a force 
might contain within it the seeds of a People’s 
Army. It was not only left-wing activists who 
believed that such a project was possible, for, at  
times, both the army and MI5 thought that the 
Home Guard might go that way. 
 
The Home Guard’s creation followed the rapid 
collapse of Norway, Denmark, and Holland under 
the German blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940. Each 
of these campaigns seemed to contemporaries 
to possess new, and frightening, military and 
political characteristics. For many British 
commentators, German forces had not 
triumphed by conventional military means alone. 
In Norway, for example, the presence of Vidkun 
Quisling, and his collaborationist Nasjonal 
Samling (NS), seemed to indicate that native 
fascist support for the Germans was a key factor 
explaining the invaders' success13 - and the fear 
of unconventional, politicised warfare loomed 
large in Britain. The unconventional nature of this 
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perceived threat led to the desire for an area 
defence force which could contain any surprise 
attack and combat politically motivated Fifth 
Column activity until the regular army arrived. It 
was the stress on the unconventional and 
political nature of the threat that gave hope to the 
People’s Army enthusiasts in the Home Guard. 
 
By the end of June 1940, there were over one 
million men (and many 'unofficial' women14) in 
the Home Guard. There was little to equip them 
with, either in terms of uniforms or weapons, and 
little in the way of formal training available. 
These weaknesses gave the volunteers an 
opportunity to take matters into their own hands, 
and they seized that opportunity, bringing a 
sense of initiative and enthusiasm to the force 
that characterised it throughout its life. By the 
autumn of 1940, the Home Guard was largely 
uniformed, and was fairly well equipped, with 
800,000 Springfield rifles from the USA,  
American Thompson sub-machine guns, Lewis 
machine guns, and simple anti-tank weapons. 
The Home Guard also manned anti-aircraft guns 
(140,000 Home Guard gunners by 1944), and 
coastal defence artillery. In addition, a secret 
underground guerrilla force - the Auxunits15 - had 
been established, largely composed of Home 
Guards. The Home Guard was, therefore, a large 
force, and the Army had clear views on how it 
should be used, views that were not often shared 
by the Home Guards themselves, and certainly 
not by the People’s Army enthusiasts among 
them. 
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4. Home Guard Socialism: a Vision of the 
People's Army. 
  
 
A time of flux 
 
The mobilisation of the people, the rapid 
expansion of a wide range of auxiliary units, and 
the feeling that many of the politicians who had 
led Britain into war were, at best, incompetent, 
and, at worst, nazi sympathisers, created a 
sense of the need for a rapid reassessment of 
social, economic, political, and military norms. 
When Guilty Men,16 a polemic against 
appeasement, was published in July, 1940 
(selling over 220,000 copies, and being reprinted 
12 times that July alone), it looked as if a new, 
patriotic, anti-nazi and socialist discourse was 
going to dominate the political landscape of 
Britain under siege. To contemporary 
commentators, British political and social life was 
in flux, and the feeling among many was that 
there was scope for radical change within Britain. 
For some, particularly on the left, Britain was not 
only faced with the probability of invasion but 
also by the possibility of social revolution. Yet, by 
the winter of 1941, writing in the American 
Partisan Review, George Orwell offered a 
damning analysis of the failure of much of the left 
to capitalise on the situation, in particular to 
capitalise on the creation of the Home Guard:  
 
'The personnel of the Home Guard is not 
quite the same now as it was in the 
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beginning. The men who flocked into the 
ranks in the first few days were almost all 
of them men who had fought in the last 
war and were too old for this one. The 
weapons that were distributed, therefore, 
went into the hands of people who were 
more or less anti-Fascist but politically 
uneducated. The only leavening was a 
few class-conscious factory-workers and 
a handful of men who had fought in the 
Spanish Civil War. The Left as usual 
failed to see its opportunity - the Labour 
Party could have made the Home Guard 
into its own organization if it had acted 
vigorously in the first few days - and in 
left-wing circles it was fashionable to 
describe the Home Guard as a Fascist 
organization.'17 
 
Orwell went on to note that the Communist Party 
of Great Britain (CPGB) forbade its members 
from joining the Home Guard, in keeping with its 
opposition to the war, which would continue until 
Hitler broke his pact with Stalin with the invasion 
of the USSR in June, 1941.  However, Orwell did 
identify, for his American audience, two key 
members of a small, but very active group of ex-
communists and Spanish Civil War veterans who 
had seen both military and political potential in 
this mass organisation: 
 
'The chief educative force within the 
movement [the LDV/Home Guard] has 
been the training school which was 
started by Tom Wintringham, Hugh Slater 
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and others [...] Their teaching was purely 
military, but with its insistence on guerrilla 
methods it had revolutionary implications 
which were perfectly well grasped by 
many of the men who listened to it.'18 
 
Orwell was correct in identifying Tom 
Wintringham and Hugh Slater as key players in 
the training of the Home Guard in 1940, 
particularly at the Home Guard training school at 
Osterley Park, but he was inaccurate in his 
assessment that they restricted themselves to 
'purely military' teaching. For such men also saw 
in the Home Guard the potential for the force to 
make a significant contribution to the 
radicalisation of British political and social life.  
 
 
The Home Guard socialists 
 
Both Tom Wintringham and Hugh Slater were 
Spanish Civil War veterans, as were other 
members of a loose grouping associated with 
Wintringham, who had been the commanding 
officer of the British battalion of the International 
Brigades in February 1937, before being 
wounded. Other figures with a background in the 
International Brigades included F.O. Miksche, 
and Bert 'Yank' Levy, who both worked with 
Wintringham on Home Guard training. In 
addition, there were other Home Guard 
educators and publicists on the left concerned 
with the military and political implications of the 
organisation. These included the Sunday 
Pictorial journalist and columnist,  Major John 
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Langdon-Davies who had covered both the 
Spanish Civil War, and the 'Winter War' between 
Finland and the USSR, and described himself as 
'an anti-Fascist journalist'. Another journalist, 
novelist, and a veteran of the Great War, was 
John Brophy, who was a close friend of the 
famous First World War memoirist, Vera Brittain. 
Langdon-Davies wrote the standard handbooks, 
The Home Guard Training Manual (1940), and 
The Home Guard Fieldcraft Manual (1942),  
while John Brophy authored A Home Guard Drill 
Book and Field Service Manual (1940). Brophy 
also wrote a best-selling tribute to the Home 
Guard, Britain's Home Guard; a character study 
(1945). This very popular account of the 
movement was illustrated by the war artist Eric 
Kennington (famous for his portrait illustrations in 
T.E.Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom). 
Kennington's colour illustrations of Home 
Guardsmen complemented Brophy's text by 
showing Home Guardsmen in their wider civilian 
context. Portraits showed, for example, 
'Sergeant Stokes, Huntingdonshire Home Guard' 
in his farmworker's clothes19, while two facing 
portraits showed 'Melvin Jones, miner', and 
'Corporal Melvin Jones, Monmouthshire Home 
Guard'20.  Kennington's illustrations were a very 
graphic portrayal of the idea of the Home Guard 
as a citizens' army. All the Home Guard 
enthusiasts, like Wintringham, Slater, Miksche, 
Brophy, Langdon-Davies, and Levy,  played an 
important part in the popularising of a left-wing 
analysis of the military and political significance 
of the Home Guard. Their contribution to the 
training of that organisation was notable, 
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especially in the 1940-1941 period, and their 
widely read books, pamphlets and articles on the 
role and character of the Home Guard were 
unique in that they postulated an active, political 
significance to this military movement.  
 
The historiography of left-wing involvement in the 
Home Guard is limited, and largely focused on 
the life and writings of Tom Wintringham. David 
Fernbach, in the early 1980s,  put Wintringham's 
contribution to the Home Guard in the context of 
his Marxism, his Spanish experience, and, 
interestingly, in attempts by the left in the 1980s 
to develop a credible, non-nuclear defence policy 
for the UK. Fernbach's 'Tom Wintringham and 
socialist defense strategy' remains the most 
detailed consideration of Wintringham's ideas. 
Hugh Purcell, in his recent, ground-breaking 
biography of Wintringham, The Last English 
Revolutionary (2004), produced a very readable 
life of a remarkable man, rightly characterised by 
Purcell as being an 'English revolutionary'. 
Finally, S.P. MacKenzie in his, The Home Guard 
(1995), devoted some space to the involvement 
of a range of left wing figures with the Home 
Guard, thereby putting Wintringham's efforts into 
a wider context. MacKenzie's chapter, 'A 
People's Militia? 1940-1', focuses primarily on 
Wintringham's struggles with the War Office and 
the Army, as they sought to minimise the impact 
of the Osterley Park group of socialists, but says 
less about the specific ideas of those activists21. 
What characterised Wintringham and the other 
socialist enthusiasts for the Home Guard was the 
combination of practical involvement in Home 
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Guard training, allied to the development in 
lectures, newspapers, books, and pamphlets of a 
specifically socialist analysis of contemporary 
military imperatives. In the period 1940-1941, 
these enthusiasts developed an approach to the 
defence and transformation of Britain that can 
usefully be termed Home Guard socialism. 
 
 
An alliance of the progressive classes 
 
The idea of the Popular Front dominated Home 
Guard socialism. For the CPGB, as with other 
communist parties that took their line from the 
Comintern, the Popular Front had been one 
more tactic in a roll-call of tactics that had 
marked the evolution of Moscow-led communism 
since the early 1920s. In 1935, the Comintern 
instructed Moscow-affiliated communist parties 
to abandon their previous sectarian policy, 'class 
against class'. Reacting to the failure of the 
German Communist Party in the face of nazism, 
the Comintern instructed its followers 'to 
overcome, in the shortest time possible, the 
survivals of sectarian traditions which have 
hindered them in finding a way of approach to 
the Social-Democratic workers'22. No longer was 
the British Labour Party to be dismissed as 
'social fascist', instead the CPGB strove to create 
a 'united front' with the Labour movement - 
something that the Labour Party studiously 
ignored. Nonetheless, the Comintern's volte face 
enabled British communists to emerge from the 
isolation of 'class against class' and reach out to 
a wider audience than they had for the previous 
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seven years. For the leadership of the CPGB this 
move was, above all else, merely a tactical 
move, but for many of their followers, the 'united 
front', or Popular Front period, was also driven 
by the desire to create an effective alliance of 
anti-fascists from among the progressive 
classes. 
 
For the Home Guard socialists, men like Tom 
Wintringham who had been a very early member 
of the CPGB, the Popular Front had real 
meaning. Wintringham himself was from a long-
established bourgeois family, had been privately 
educated, and, after service in the Royal Flying 
Corps in the Great War, had taken a shortened 
war service degree at Balliol College, Oxford. 
Similarly, Hugh Slater, another of the key Home 
Guard socialists, an International Brigades’ 
commissar, and the commander of the British 
battalion's anti-tank gun unit in Spain, was 
educated at Tonbridge School and the University 
of London. For communists like these, the 
Popular Front had a direct appeal, and seemed 
to take shape in Spain, when a small but vocal 
minority of bourgeois communists and anti-
fascists volunteered to fight with the International 
Brigades, alongside the workers who formed the 
majority of the international combatants. Yet 
there were notable class tensions among the 
British volunteers, as James Hopkins pointed out 
in his  detailed study of the British in the Spanish 
Civil War23. Hopkins noted that the fifth 
commanding officer of the British battalion, Fred 
Copeman, grouped most of the young students, 
graduates, and educated workers together in the 
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anti-tank gun unit, as a deliberate act of class 
segregation aimed at reducing class tensions in 
the battalion.  Although Slater, who commanded 
the unit, was regarded by most as being a very 
effective soldier, Hopkins argued that Slater's: 
 
'ability to understand and gain the co-
operation of his working class 
subordinates was severely limited. A 
Durham miner who had been with the 
battalion from the start, and was 
described as a "good proletarian type" 
was forced to leave the Anti-Tanks 
"because of differences with Slater". 
Another comrade in the Anti-Tanks, Jim 
Brewer, despised the young officer'24.  
 
There was a feeling among many of the working 
class volunteers who came in contact with Slater, 
that he  made no 'effort to disguise his contempt 
for working men'25. 
 
If the day to day reality of campaigning with the 
International Brigades was not as free of class 
tension as might have been hoped, it was in 
Spain that some of the British volunteers for the 
Republic came to feel that the realities of the 
Comintern's tactics were much worse than 
tensions between individuals. Foremost among 
these was George Orwell, whose experiences 
fighting with the POUM (Partido Obero de 
Unificación Marxista - a revolutionary, anti-
Stalinist communist party), and his witnessing of 
the Barcelona 'May events' in 1937, led him to 
the conclusion that the communist idea of the 
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'Popular Front' was nothing more than a betrayal 
of the revolution in Catalonia, and the 
implementation of fascism by another name. 
Orwell later referred to the Popular Front in 
Spain as being like 'a pig with two heads or 
some other Barnum & Bailey monstrosity'. 
Interestingly, other anti-fascists in Spain who 
later formed the core of the Home Guard 
socialists took the communist line that the 
crushing of the POUM and the anarchists in 
Republican Spain by the socialists and 
communists was merely the crushing of an 
attempted 'Trotsky-fascist' coup. As a leading 
member of the International Brigades, and a 
member of the CPGB, Tom Wintringham 
accepted this line. Another of the Home Guard 
socialists of 1940-1941, John Langdon-Davies, 
also followed the communist view in his reporting 
for the News Chronicle, alleging that the 
anarchists and the POUM were the tools of  
fascist agents provocateurs. Writing about the 
'May Days' in Barcelona for the News Chronicle, 
Langdon-Davies commented: 
 
'This has not been an Anarchist uprising. 
It is a frustrated putsch of the Trotskyist 
POUM, working through their controlled 
organisations, "Friends of Durruti" and 
Libertarian Youth...The tragedy began on 
Monday afternoon when the Government 
sent armed police into the Telephone 
Building, to disarm the workers there, 
mostly CNT men. Grave irregularities in 
the service had been a scandal for some 
time [...] By Wednesday evening, 
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however, it began to be clear who was 
behind the revolt. All the walls had been 
plastered with an inflammatory poster 
calling for an immediate revolution and 
for the shooting of Republican and 
Socialist leaders. It was signed by the 
"Friends of Durruti". On Thursday 
morning the Anarchist daily denied all 
knowledge or sympathy with it, but La 
Batalla, the POUM paper, reprinted the 
document with the highest praise. 
Barcelona, the first city of Spain, was 
plunged into bloodshed by agents 
provocateurs using this subversive 
organisation.'26 
 
Yet, despite their differing interpretations of the 
reality of the Popular Front in the late 1930s, the 
key Home Guard socialists believed that a 
successful defence of Britain had to lie in an 
alliance of the progressive classes. Further, 
following the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the CPGB had 
performed yet another volte face, and 
abandoned the idea of a Popular Front. But by 
then, none of the Home Guard socialists were 
members of the CPGB, most having been 
expelled from the party, in Wintringham's case 
because he refused to end his relationship with 
the American anti-fascist, Kitty Bowler, whom the 
CPGB regarded as a Trotskyist spy. 
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A patriotic, anti-nazi defence 
 
The Home Guard socialists stressed that victory 
over nazism would be a result of the efforts of 
the entire British people. Their appeals were 
made to all those who wished to engage in a 
patriotic, anti-nazi defence of Britain. That 
defence, to be effective, was to be built upon a 
socialist programme, one that would be of benefit 
to all patriots, including what Orwell 
characterised as 'the great mass of middling 
people, the £6 a week to £2,000 a year class 
who will defeat Hitler if class privilege is wiped 
out and socialism brought in'27. This was the 
class that Wintringham saw as being the 
'meritocratic class', the technicians that ran 
modern industry, and had strong anti-Nazi 
sympathies28. The obstacles to the successful 
defence of Britain and the ultimate defeat of 
nazism by the progressive classes, were seen to 
come from pro-nazi sympathisers in high places, 
and those who put the interests of private capital 
before those of Britain, the British people, and 
the war effort. In his best-selling Penguin 
Special, New Ways of War (July, 1940), Tom 
Wintringham argued for the expansion of the 
Home Guard to four million men, creating a 
people in arms, which was, he claimed, both a 
revolutionary idea, and a patriotic and 
quintessentially British idea. Those who opposed 
such an idea were, he implied, incompetent, or 
worse: 
 
'There are those who say that the idea of 
arming the people is a revolutionary idea. 
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It certainly is. And after what we have 
seen of the efficiency and patriotism of 
those who ruled us until recently, most of 
us can find plenty of room in this country 
for some sort of revolution, for a change 
that will sweep away the muck of the 
past. But arming the people is also 
completely part of the tradition of the 
British.'29 
 
George Orwell, a sergeant in the Home Guard, 
complained about the class structure of the 
movement, but also noted that its character was, 
'in the lower ranks [...] extremely democratic and 
comradely.'30 Further, the events of 1940, at 
home and abroad,  contributed to a new, 
essentially left-wing, political outlook that crossed 
classes: 
 
'The political discussions that one hears 
in [Home Guard] canteens and guard 
rooms are much more intelligent than 
they were, and the social shake-up 
among men of all classes who have now 
been forced into close intimacy for a 
considerable time has done a lot of 
good.'31 
 
For these socialists, the Home Guard was both 
an instrument, and the concrete expression of, a 
real 'Popular Front', one built upon patriotic, 
progressive, anti-nazism. 
 
The Home Guard socialists argued that the 
movement was an essentially British 
  
 25 
phenomenon, and that such a people's militia 
had a long and distinguished pedigree in British 
history. This was a common theme - a popular 
account of the defence of Britain through time, 
published in 1945, after the Home Guard had 
been 'stood down', summed up the view of its 
author, John Radnor, that It All Happened 
Before: 'there is nothing more typically and 
historically English than the large army of spare-
time soldiers now called the Home Guard.'32 
 
However, from the Home Guard socialists' 
standpoint, previous manifestations of the 
popular defence of Britain were important not just 
because they attested to the enduring patriotism 
of the population, but also because those 
manifestations could be fitted neatly into their 
narrative of a popular, people's movement. Bert 
'Yank' Levy, a Canadian who fought with the 
British battalion at Jarama, was another of 
Wintringham's comrades at the Osterley Park 
training school. Levy had served with Royal 
Fusiliers in the Near East during the First World 
War, and then, by his own account, had been 
involved in the Sandinista revolt in Nicaragua in 
the 1920s33. He was captured on the second day 
of the British battalion's action at Jarama, and a 
photograph exists of Levy with other captured 
British machine gunners being guarded by 
Nationalist Guardia Civil. He taught classes in 
'unconventional warfare', which formed the basis 
of his Penguin Special, Guerrilla Warfare (1941, 
with an introduction, and, it appears, some input 
from Wintringham himself). 
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'The LDV Armlet (1940)', from Radnor (1945) 
 
In Guerrilla Warfare, Levy referred to a range of 
precursors to a projected Home Guard guerrilla 
defence of Britain. He made a direct connection 
between the 'heavily armoured forces' of William 
the Conqueror and those of Hitler, holding up 
Hereward the Wake as a model of resistance to 
the Home Guard, albeit one, as Levy admitted, 
who failed to defeat the invader. Similarly, 
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Wintringham drew upon the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, 
and the raising of volunteers throughout British 
history to underpin his argument that the people 
should be armed: 
 
'It is in fact part of the British Constitution, 
and the fyrd of Anglo-Saxon times, the 
militia or volunteers of latter periods, have 
often been called "the Constitutional 
Force", because it is part of the 
fundamental law of this country that each 
able-bodied citizen can and should have 
arms for training for defence.'34 
 
By basing their argument that the people should 
be armed in their reading of British history, the 
Home Guard socialists were attempting to 
strengthen their call for an organisation that they 
imagined had the potential to become a force like 
the militias in the Spanish Civil War. At the height 
of the invasion fear in June 1940, Orwell wrote, 
in a letter to Time and Tide,  that, 'at such a time 
our slogan should be ARM THE PEOPLE'35. 
Many socialists saw this as being the key to 
creating a revolutionary situation, or, at least, to 
helping to shift the balance of power from the 
state to the people. As Orwell put it in the 
Evening Standard: 'That rifle hanging on the wall 
of the working class flat or labourer's cottage is 
the symbol of democracy'36. And one of the 
common complaints that the Home Guard 
socialists had in 1940, as the force became 
better equipped, was that its members were, at 
first, forbidden to take their weapons home with 
them. This, they argued, made no sense 
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militarily; nor, they might have added, politically, 
but it ignored the fact even by Autumn of 1940, 
at least 740,000 out of nearly 1,700,000 Home 
Guard were without personal weapons of any 
sort, and ammunition was in short supply for all 
weapons37. 
 
 
Models of resistance 
 
The Home Guard socialists were also able to 
draw upon a wide range of contemporary, and 
near contemporary, examples of the sort of 
organisations and types of warfare that they felt 
the Home Guard could emulate. All these 
proselytisers drew upon the examples of T.E. 
Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, the Irish war of 
independence, the Spanish Civil War, aspects of 
the Sino-Japanese War, the Winter War between 
Finland and the USSR, and, later, partisan 
activity on the Eastern Front. Such conflicts 
provided examples of militia, irregular, and 
guerrilla warfare. John Langdon-Davies in his 
lecture, 'Why the Home Guard?', drew upon his 
experience of the Winter War, and upon some 
slightly more exotic examples of the sort of 
warfare that he felt the Home Guard was capable 
of: 
 
'There is another kind of war - "Small 
War" or "Guerrilla", and here everything is 
very different. This is the kind of war 
which the Spaniard has fought for 
centuries amid his mountains - the Finn 
amid his frozen lakes and forests. This in 
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a way is the kind of war the Chicago 
gangsters and G-men fight incessantly in 
the suburbs of that great city [...] this is 
the kind of war which was waged in the 
marshes of the Chaco Canyon in South 
America.'38 
 
'Yank' Levy, in Guerrilla Warfare, made particular 
reference to the Irish war of independence, 
noting that 'the Irish were the first guerrillas to 
fight against an army that largely manoeuvred by 
vehicle', something that was of direct relevance 
to a Home Guard faced by a potential invasion 
by what was thought of as being a highly 
mechanised army39. Levy also made extensive 
reference to the Arab Revolt, and Orde 
Wingate's role in organising 'Jewish irregulars in 
Palestine'. Levy's advice to the Home Guard was 
to read fictional accounts of the campaigns in 
Ireland, Spain and China, namely O'Malley's  On 
Another Man's Wound, Hemingway's For Whom 
the Bell Tolls, and Edgar Snow's Scorched 
Earth.  
 
Guerrilla warfare was not the only focus of the 
Home Guard socialists. They also developed an 
analysis of the operation of blitzkrieg, and offered 
a wide variety of military methods to combat the 
tactic. These military methods were closely 
related to a political analysis of the implication of 
armoured and mechanised warfare, and, in turn, 
were tied to their arguments for socialism and a 
people in arms. In New Ways of War, Tom 
Wintringham took as his starting point an 
analysis of blitzkrieg, and offered his response to 
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that strikingly successful method of waging war. 
But it was a book by a former officer in the 
Czechoslovak army, the International Brigades 
and the regular Republican Army, F.O. Miksche, 
Blitzkrieg (1941), that provided the most 
thorough analysis and critique of the tactic. 
Wintringham was involved in the translation and 
provided an introduction to Blitzkrieg, in which 
Miksche gave a detailed account of German 
tactics that had brought such stunning success in 
Poland, western Europe, and at the time of 
publication, on the Eastern Front. He then 
proposed both defensive and offensive tactics 
with which to combat the blitzkrieg method. 
Where his analysis was most pertinent to the 
Home Guard enthusiasts was in relation to his 
theory of 'web defence'. This proposed that 
blitzkrieg could be successfully met by defence 
in great depth, built around 'islands of 
resistance', that were, in effect, all-arms 
defensive positions, interlinked, and possessing 
the capacity to take operational initiative without 
reference to a higher chain of command. This 
type of defence against the German concept of 
blitzkrieg had been adopted, with local success, 
by the French in the latter stages of the Battle of 
France, but too late to make any difference to the 
outcome in the summer of 1940. 
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The cover of 'Yank' Levy's Guerrilla Warfare (1941) 
 
Nonetheless, Miksche's analysis had a particular 
attraction for the Home Guard enthusiasts, and 
Wintringham, in his introduction, highlighted this 
element of the book.  Whatever this type of 
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defence was called - total defence, 'web 
defence',  defence in depth - it gave a key role to 
the Home Guard. As Orwell noted in late 1941: 
 
'The strategic idea of the Home Guard is 
static defence in complete depth, i.e. from 
one coast of England to the other. The 
tactical idea is not so much to defeat an 
invader as to hold him up till the regular 
troops can get at him.'40 
 
 
Military roles for the Home Guard 
 
Over time the role of the Home Guard changed, 
both in the views of the government, the army, 
and the Home Guard socialists. The army was, 
throughout the Home Guard's existence, keen 
that it fulfilled two main functions, that of local 
reconnaissance and the defence of local areas. 
But many Home Guard wanted to have more 
active roles, aiming to increase their own 
mobility, or prepare for guerrilla warfare should 
their local areas be occupied. Writing at the end 
of 1941, Orwell commented on changing 
perceptions of the Home Guard's role. He 
identified six different roles: in 1940, the key 
roles had been to combat sabotage and the Fifth 
Column, while guarding against airborne assault. 
This was followed, once the summer invasion 
scare was over, by a move towards making the 
Home Guard into ordinary infantry. In 1941 the 
emphasis changed again, as events in North 
Africa and Crete suggested that the Home Guard 
should concentrate on anti-tank warfare, and, 
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once more, on countering paratroopers. Then, 
with the emergence of Soviet Partisans in the 
areas of the Soviet Union rapidly overrun by the 
Germans, Home Guard volunteers seemed to 
have a potential role as guerrillas41. Whatever 
the precise function of the Home Guard, one 
constant for the socialists was that it should have 
an active, central role in the defence of Britain, 
providing aspects of defence that only an armed 
population could provide. 
 
Writing in 1945, John Brophy, in his Britain's 
Home Guard, outlined the events of 1940 that 
led to the spontaneous organisation of men into 
self-defence groups, followed quickly by Anthony 
Eden's appeal for men for the Local Defence 
Volunteers. For the Home Guard socialists the 
fact that groups of men had come together prior 
to Eden's broadcast, especially groups of trade 
unionists who began to organise factory-based 
defence, was yet another example of the way in 
which patriotic, anti-Nazi workers were ahead of 
the government in the struggle to defend Britain. 
Brophy explained the particular fears of the 
summer of 1940: 
 
'The Home Guard came into being in May 
1940, before Dunkirk. At that time 
Norway had been overrun, and Denmark 
annexed in a single casual gesture. 
Rotterdam had been blasted into 
submission by air bombardment, and 
parachute troops, disguised or in their 
proper uniforms, were paralysing the 
communication centres of Dutch 
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resistance, in co-operation with the "fifth 
column". These were the enemies the 
Home Guard was designed first and 
foremost to meet and overcome - the 
parachutist and the fifth column.'42 
 
Langdon-Davies, in his lectures of the winter of 
1940, also laid great emphasis on these two 
elements, arguing, inaccurately, that the fall of 
Norway was almost entirely due to Quisling and 
his fifth column, while paratroopers and airborne 
troops were, more accurately, blamed for the fall 
of Holland. The fifth column threat loomed large 
in 1940, and led to the internment of 'enemy 
aliens' (often refugees from nazi Germany, or 
long-time residents of the UK), IRA men, and 
around 800 leading members of the British Union 
of Fascists. The paratroops fear lasted much 
longer, being given a further boost with the fall of 
Crete to German airborne forces in May 1941. 
The Home Guard enthusiasts were quick to point 
out that whether it was fifth columnists, 
paratroopers, or armoured and mechanised 
assault, the Home Guard had a role, as it could 
provide constant, if limited, coverage, across the 
whole territory of Britain, against any of these 
threats, something that regular forces could not. 
Further, the Home Guard socialists believed that 
the movement contained within it a large number 
of men who wanted social change, and that their 
effectiveness as a defensive force was tied to 
that radicalism. John Brophy, who had been an 
underaged volunteer in 1914, and had written 
two best-selling novels about the Great War, The 
Bitter End (1928) and The World Went Mad 
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(1934), referred to the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the initial LDV volunteers had been 
men from the Great War, who had maintained an 
idealistic desire for social change: 
 
'This [...] hope for a radical impetus to 
social, economic, and political 
improvement survived the 
disillusionments of the battle-field, the 
parade-ground, and the field hospital [of 
the First War] better than the poetic and 
youthful idealism of selfless patriotism.'43 
 
This was a reflection, perhaps, of Edith Cavell's 
view that 'patriotism was not enough', and it was 
certainly the view of the socialists that patriotism 
met anti-nazism, and a desire for social change, 
in the Home Guard. 
 
 
Social radicalism and the people's defence 
 
Defence against saboteurs, paratroopers, or 
armoured assault, all required, in the socialists' 
view, a different mindset in the Home Guard than 
in other, more traditional, military formations. 
Wintringham repeatedly argued that the unit of 
command had been steadily reduced by 
historical developments in warfare. In the face of 
modern war, characterised by the disruption of 
the chain of command, widely dispersed 
encounters on a huge, non-linear front, and by a 
host of unorthodox tactics, soldiers had to be 
able to be their own leaders. Writing about his 
experiences in Spain, Wintringham commented: 
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'I drew the conclusion that in defence as 
well as in attack the initiative of the 
subordinate commander and of the 
ordinary soldier is the most vital quality to 
be cultivated.'44 
 
Further, the Home Guard socialists envisaged 
the Home Guard being involved in guerrilla war 
should Britain be invaded and partly occupied. In 
all these cases, they argued, it would be 
important for Home Guard soldiers to be trained 
to operate on their own initiative. For this to 
happen, however, the Home Guard had to be 
fully imbued with a sense of democracy and the 
desire for social progress. This linkage of military 
effectiveness with social radicalism was at the 
heart of the Home Guard socialists' message. 
'Yank' Levy argued that effective guerrilla 
resistance could only emerge from among 
people who benefited from a democratic political 
culture. His view was that, for guerrillas to be 
effective, they had to be imbued with 
independence of action and a freedom to use 
their initiative which arose most effectively under 
democratic systems. He contrasted this with 
what he felt was the inability of fascist or nazi 
systems to produce effective guerrilla 
movements: 
 
'We in Britain can go much farther than 
can the Germans , when it comes to the 
development and utilization of guerrilla 
methods, for both attack and defence. 
There are ways open to us which are 
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closed to the Nazis. For we are men of 
democratic tradition, fighting for freedom, 
and guerrilla warfare is essentially the 
weapon of free men - a guerrilla band 
functioning efficiently under compulsion is 
inconceivable. Fascism or Nazism - and 
they are fundamentally the same - set out 
to destroy in men the very qualities which 
are most prized in guerrilla fighting. Free 
men, hating oppression, with freedom of 
initiative and arms in their hands - these 
make the ideal guerrillas. Therefore in the 
democratic countries there is far larger 
scope for the development of regular 
warfare along lines derived from guerrilla 
warfare. There are new ways of war 
which in this country and in Europe we 
can adopt, if we will - ways of war which 
the Nazis cannot and dare not use.'45 
 
Levy foresaw guerrilla warfare in Britain in fairly 
stark terms, and clearly felt that there were few 
among the population who should not be 
involved in this type of warfare. For example, in 
addition to talking about the killing of Quislings 
and prisoners, he also mentioned, approvingly, 
an article from Soviet War News, which covered 
the exploits of two Soviet Young Pioneers, whom 
Levy called 'Boy Scouts', aged 12 and 14, who 
had killed numerous German motorcyclists with 
wire stretched across roads. In an interesting 
aside, Levy noted, 'the British Boy Scouts who 
demonstrated how this should be done at 
Osterley, when we had not enough older 
instructors, were about the same age'46. The 
  
 38 
point was, for Levy and the other Home Guard 
socialists, that the Home Guard represented the 
entire British people in arms, as Hugh Slater 
argued: 
 
'The Home Guard is itself half civilian. It is 
a people's army. How useful it can be in 
the military sense depends wholly on the 
extent to which it reflects the needs, the 
desires, and the aspirations of the 
ordinary British people. Its purpose is a 
democratic one - to win the war against 
Fascism. The Home Guard must, 
therefore, be thoroughly permeated with 
democratic ideas, methods and 
attitudes.'47 
 
Probably unknown to any of the Home Guard 
socialists, the government did, in fact, put in 
place a guerrilla army, designed to harass 
occupying forces. This stay-behind force was the 
Auxiliary Units, or Auxunits, made up of a 
mixture of some regular soldiers, and Home 
Guard. Secret bases, known as Operational 
Bases (OBs), were set up in 1940 and stocked 
with arms and equipment. Young men with good 
local knowledge of their home areas formed the 
core of the Auxunits. They prepared in secrecy 
for the German invasion, and formed a unique 
guerrilla force in waiting. The Auxunits were a 
reasonably substantial force with, for example, 
300 men in Somerset serving in 44 Auxunits 
using 50 OBs. However, they were not, as men 
like Levy would have wanted, a large, people's 
guerrilla force48. 
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The final chapter in Wintringham's New Ways of 
War was quite explicit about the nature of these 
democratic ideas stating, 'what we need, in order 
to be strong, is a planned use of men, machines, 
and factories: in other words what we need is 
socialism.'49 Further, he went on to state, 'that 
since we need socialist measures for victory, 
these measures will be best be carried out by 
socialists.'50 This socialist programme was to be 
protected by a four million strong Home Guard 
(in fact, the Home Guard's peak membership 
was around 1,700,000) that would be largely 
responsible for the defence of Britain, while the 
regular armed forces were deployed overseas. In 
addition, just as the Home Guard socialists 
proposed that socialists should be running the 
war at a macro level, they also stressed the role 
that ordinary Home Guardsmen could have in 
strengthening socialism, and the link between 
the Home Guard and socialists, at the local level. 
In preparing  the defence of local areas, Hugh 
Slater argued, it was not sufficient for Home 
Guard units to be fully familiar with the 
geography and topography of their home area, 
they also had to be familiar with key people in 
that area. One of the fundamental duties of the 
platoon commander was that, 'he must know, 
and work in co-operation with, the Police and 
A.R.P. services, Post Office, Trade Unions, Shop 
Stewards, and, of course, the regular army 
command in the neighbourhood'51 (emphasis 
added). 
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In the summer of 1940, the Home Guard 
socialists had a direct influence on the training of 
the force. Its rapid creation, and the need for 
training, enabled Tom Wintringham and his 
comrades, backed by Edward Hutton and Picture 
Post, who funded the enterprise, and the Earl of 
Jersey, who owned Osterley Park and its 
grounds, to create the innovative Home Guard 
training school at Osterley Park. This was, in 
S.P. MacKenzie's view, 'an instant success, and 
news of it rapidly spread through word-of-mouth 
and the press'52. Five thousand Home Guards 
passed through Wintringham's training school on 
three day courses53. The school became a model 
for others, and although the War Office and the 
Army eventually managed, by May 1941, to 
wrest control of Osterley Park from the Home 
Guard socialists, their message continued to be 
read by the huge audience for their books, 
pamphlets and newspaper articles. For these 
enthusiasts, the Home Guard was a Popular 
Front in arms, patriotic, radical, anti-nazi, and 
capable of advancing the British people's cause 
on the Home Front. As Wintringham wrote in the 
Picture Post, 17th May, 1941: 
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'The Home Guard Can Fight', the cover of the issue of 
Picture Post which featured the Osterley Park Home Guard 
training school. The article was by Tom Wintringham. 
 
 
'The future of the Home Guard is to be 
recognised as democracy's answer, and 
an effective answer, to the Nazi 
technique of aggression. If we choose 
only to copy totalitarian methods we shall 
never catch up or surpass the Nazis. But 
if we set free and mobilise the initiative of 
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our people in a democratic way, in a way 
similar to that in which this defensive 
army of volunteers was raised and 
trained, I believe we shall find and 
develop ways of taking the offensive also, 
new methods of war, which the Nazis are 
doomed by their ideas and their 
organisation never to be able to 
understand or copy.'54 
 
 
 
For the British, the period from the German 
invasion of Holland in May 1940, to their assault 
upon their erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union, in 
June 1941, was a period dominated by the 
expectation of nazi invasion. Out of that 
expectation emerged the Home Guard, a force  
created so rapidly that it presented a notable 
group of revolutionary, patriotic, anti-nazis with 
the chance to strengthen the defence of Britain, 
and, they hoped, enhance the radicalism of a 
large part of the British people. For these Home 
Guard socialists the threat of invasion, and the 
need for a democratic, socialist, patriotic, and 
anti-nazi analysis of military and political 
imperatives was an opening for their unique 
contribution to Britain's war effort. In their 
extensive involvement in the practical and 
theoretical training of the Home Guard,  Britain’s 
'People's Army', the Home Guard socialists 
created a fascinating, and, perhaps, influential, 
theory of a British Popular Front in arms. 
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5. Epilogue, gone but not forgotten. 
 
 
The Home Guard socialists were not, in the end, 
successful in their attempts to foster a four 
million strong People's Army, as the government 
and the army outflanked men like Tom 
Wintringham55, but the Home Guard socialists 
were, in 1940-41, a notable aspect of Britain at 
war. It is difficult to assess the impact of the 
Home Guard socialists on the political culture of 
Britain during and after the Second World War. It 
is true, however, that this small group of veterans 
of the Spanish Civil War provided training, along 
with military and political education for tens, if not 
hundreds of thousands, of Home Guard. 
Through the Osterley Park training camp and 
their widely read publications, the Home Guard 
socialists sought to bring a form of politically 
radical military training to the British people, 
something that had not, perhaps, been 
attempted since Cromwell's New Model Army. 
The Home Guard socialists filled a yawning gap 
in Britain's defence preparations, particularly in 
the crucial time between the fall of France in the 
summer of 1940, and the German invasion of the 
USSR a year later. How far the radical political 
message of the Home Guard socialists 
permeated the mindset of the civilians in Home 
Guard uniform is hard to say, but it is not unlikely 
that they helped shift the political culture of 
Britain to the left, and towards the victory of 
Clement Attlee's Labour Party in the 1945 
general election. 
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All that is a long time ago now, and the dominant 
discourse of British politics has changed beyond 
anything that the Home Guard socialists could 
probably have imagined. But neither the Home 
Guard, nor the international volunteers of the 
Spanish Civil War have been forgotten. Not only 
does academic interest in both continue to grow, 
but among that satisfyingly British pastime of 
'Living History', or 'Historical Re-enactment', both 
Home Guard and international volunteers for 
Spain groups are flourishing. Groups like La 
Columna and Men of Britain56 continue to bring 
the history of the Spanish Civil War and the 
Home Guard to the  compatriots and 
descendants of the Home Guard socialists.  
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